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DIRECT REGULATION OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
THE RECENT telephone investigation by the Federal Communications Com-
mission' has focused a critical spotlight on regulation of the Bell Telephone
1. For its history, see infra p. 1021. Findings and rcc&,mmondatitins of the investi-
gators are contained in FimauL Co l UNiCATiONS ComImiIiS10.. Pnoroseo RcroT, Ti-
PHoNE I.;vEsTIG.ATIOx (1938) hereinafter cited as PnorosED REronm. The PrtDrosEm
REPORT is largely based on 77 staff reports, which elicited 41 "Comments' in Pamphlet
form from the Company in 1937; these comments will be cited as A.T.&T. CO MNTg
No. .. , p. On December 5, 1938 the Company filed with the Commission a brief
attacking the PRoPosED REPORT; it will be referred to as A. T.&T. Bniex. This was
followed by a supplement, listing alleged factual errors in the Pnorosno REoCmT. The
Commission has had these various documents under advisement in prcparaton fur a
Final Report to Congress. See Hearings before House Appropriations Snbcommittee on
Independent Offlces Appropriation Bill, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 149-7.
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System, the world's largest private enterprise. 2 With some five billion in
assets, 685,000 stockholders, almost 300,000 employees, and an annual oper-
ating income of slightly more than a billion,3 it operates or controls about
907o of the nation's telephone business.4 Yet the structure of the industry,
in contrast to the crazy pyramids erected by other utility empires, is relatively
simple. Twenty-one operating companies, known as the Associated Coln-
panies, divide the country into geographical units varying in size from the
District of Columbia to an area of seven states extending from Mexico to
Canada. 5 All are controlled through stock ownership by the American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. In sixteen companies this amounts to virtually 100%
of their voting stock; in only two is the A. T. & T. interest less than 50%.0
In addition, A. T. & T. holds 99.43 of the stock of Western Electric Co.,
a three hundred million dollar company which manufactures or supplies most
of the equipment used in the system.7
There are two major divisions of A. T. & T., the General Department
and the Long Lines Department. The latter, with a plant investment of
$442,500,000,8 handles interstate inter-company calls for distances of more
than forty miles and, together with the Associated Companies, completely
dominates long-distance telephony. 9 Functionally, it stands in approximately
the same relation to the General Department as do the Associated Companies.
The General Department, besides purely holding-company duties, performs a
great variety of engineering, research, supervisory, and financial services for
the operating companies. Legally, these activities are based on the license
contracts, so-called because they originally dealt principally with patent
2. See The World's Biggest Corporation, 2 FORTUNE (Sept. 1930) 37. Other
accounts of the telephone industry include RHODES, BEGINNINGS OF TELPIION-Y (1929) ;
HARLOW, OLD WIRES AND NEW WAVES (1936); PAGE, MODERN COMMUNICATIONS
(1932); HERRING & GRoss, TELECOmMUNICATIONS (1936) c. 3.
3. See A. T. & T. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1938 (1939). The number of employees
fell from 316,600 in 1937 to 292,300 in 1938. Id. at 12. The Southern New England
and Cincinnati & Suburban Tel. Cos. are excluded from these and similar computations
in the Annual Reports because A. T. & T. states that it does not control them. Id. at 31.
4. See PROPosED REPORT 165. Though independent telephone companies operate 20%
of the country's telephone stations, they are generally small and comparatively poor. See
N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1939, p. 32, col. 1.
5. The Mountain States Tel. Co. PROPOSED REPORT 73. The smallest in point of
assets is the Diamond State Tel. Co. (Delaware), with $9,500,000; the largest, The New
York Tel. Co., with $846,000,000. Id. at 80.
6. Southern New England Tel. Co., 33 1/3%; Cincinnati & Suburban Dell Tel. Co.,
30%. PRoPosED REPORT 117.
7. Id. at 85. The diffusion of A. T. & T. securities is such that there is no strong
stockholders' group, and management control, centering in the President, has prevailed
for many years. See PROPOSED REPORT 103-30.
8. A. T. & T. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1938 (1939) 26.
9. PROPOSED REPORT C. 12. Long Lines also handles some intra-company business
for the Northwestern, Southwestern, and Southern Bell Tel. Companies. Id. at 425.
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licenses.' 0 They purport to obligate the parent company to render services
in return for 131% of the gross operating income of the licensees." Con-
tractual notions aside, the work of the General Department of the A. T. & T.,
and of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, a subsidiary corporation, has a double
aspect: first, research and development are centralized, an economical arrange-
ment facilitating system-wide standardization; second, practical day-to-day
control of policy and operation is achieved in all matters of more than local
importance, without exerting the mechanics of stock ownership. For a system
which, properly, is highly integrated, concentration of both functions at its
apex is normal, and, if efficiently performed, advantageous.'-
Such a -vast concentration of power, however, demands effective regulation
on several counts. The prices of the Bell System must le made and checked
artificially, for it has both a near-monopoly nationally and a local monopoly
in each community it serves. In the telephone as a national communications
necessity lurks a public interest which would be quickened by war or internal
crisis, 13 and which is intensified by A. T. & T.'s control of wire hook-ups for
chain broadcasting. And, indubitably, the telephone companies are public
utilities, common "carriers", with a duty to serve all comers within reason ;4
only by administrative techniques can this duty be practicably enforced.
Though state regulatory bodies have usually been preoccupied with price,
they have always been hampered in testing the reasonableness of ex-penses and
earnings because A. T. & T.'s status as a non-utility corporation domiciled in
New York immunized its activities from any direct commission jurisdiction. 15
For many years the license contract payments were the most controversial
example of this jurisdictional partition of an indivisible organism. Until 1926,
the rate was 4327 of gross operating revenues, 0 a payment often contested
as excessive.17 The Company contended that since the services were un-
10. PRoposrD REPORT 169.
11. PRoposEr REPORT c. 6. For the form of the contract, see id. at 735.
12. Cf., id. at 115-30, 197.
13. See FFzDa.'L COmNUiTIcATIONS Commisssiox, A.StEAL RErrnr Yoa 1937-38
(1939) v.
14. State ex rel. Webster v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 17 Neb. 126. 22 X. W. 237 (1835);
cf. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 214 Iowa 1100, 240 X. W. 252
(1932).
15. See Public Service Comm. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., P.U.R. 1925 B,
545, 566 (1924).
16. This included rental for telephone instruments at that time owned by A.T. & T.
and leased to the Associated Companies.
17. In addition to cases cited (1936) 49 HARv. L. Riv. 982-3, sce Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595, 603 (N. D. Ill. 1933), ra",'d on oier grotads, Lindieimer
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934); Re Ohio Bell TeL Co., 2 P.U.R. (-:.s.)
113, 154 (1934), aff'd, Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 131 Ohio St. 539,
3 N. E. (2d) 475 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 301 U. S. 292 (1937). Citations to
P.U.R. in this Comment, unless otherwise distinguished, refer to commission decisions,
and the name of the state is omitted if the name of the cumpany makes it obvious, as,
e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. above.
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deniably valuable and the rate was fixed by a bona fide "contract", the Com-
missions must unquestioningly accept the payments as operating expenses
undertaken within the discretion of the associated companies. In two South-
western Bell rate cases in 1922 and 1923 the Supreme Court, apparently
misled by corporate fiction, accepted the independent contract theory, subject
only to the safeguard that bona fides should be closely scrutinized."'
These decisions foreclosed effective supervision not only of license contract
payments but, more significant, of the prices of Western Electric material.
It has been estimated that 60% of the rate base of a Bell company is composed
of materials supplied by Western, and that about half of these are nianufac-
tured by Western itself.19 Since the equipment is produced or sold tinder
near-monopoly conditions, its cost, rather than its value as measured by nis-
leading comparisons with insignificant independent manufacturers, " would
seem to be decidedly relevant in rate-making. But for a considerable period
access to the books of A. T. & T; and Western was barred by the Southwestern
Bell cases until these decisions were, in effect, partly overruled by the Chicago
Telephone case, Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company.=- The Court there
refused to subject holding companies to direct state commission jurisdiction,--
but held that, on the issue of confiscation, the burden was on the protesting
operating company to show (1) the cost of license contract services properly
allocable to it, and (2) the reasonableness of Western earnings. Thus, with-
out any formal extension of jurisdiction over them, A. T. & T. and Western
were required to justify their charges.
By the time the Chicago Telephone decision was reached, however, license
contract payments had been reduced to 1Y2%o of gross revenues.2 3 According
to the Company's cost calculations, performance of the services now entails
a large annual loss 24 which its other revenues absorb. Though much criticism
18. City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U. S. 318 (1922); Missouri
ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 276 (1923) (espe-
cially at 288). These decisions did not escape criticism. See Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
P.U.R. 1924 A, 1, 29 (1923); Michigan P. U. Comm. v. Mich. State Tel. Co., 22:1 Mich.
658, 691, 200 N. W. 749, 760 (1924).
19. PROPOSED REPORT 661-2.
20. They manufacture less thah 10% of total telephone equipment sold, and the si%
major independents sell almost 40c, of their output to Vestern. See PRoros.;D RfAoIIT
161, alleging that the independents exist only on sufferance; but cf. A. T. & T. BRIE1. 106.
21. 282 U. S. 133 (1930), hereafter referred to without further citation as "The
Chicago Telephone Case."
22. This had been proposed to end their immunity from regulation. See Lilienthal,
Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 404; Brief for
Appellant, p. 25 1, Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
23. They were cut from 4 % to 4% on Jan. 1, 1926, and from 4% to 2% in Dec.
1927, when the telephone instruments were sold to The Associated Companies for
$38,000,000. A further reduction to 1 % occurred Jan. 1, 1929. Pnoposrt, Re:'oRT 169.
24. $8,347,896 in 1936; $12,278,081 in 1930; compared with $4,660,194 profit in 1927
(all from company figures). PROPOSED REPORT 743; see Re Wisconsin Tel. Co., 13
P.U.R. (x.s.) 224, 258 (1936).
(Vol. 48: 10151018
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has been directed at the alleged costs,2 no matter how diligently they are
pared down they still seem to exceed revenues. -21 No doubt the methods of
determining the costs and then of allocating them among Long Lines and
the Associated Companies 27 are practical shortcuts rather than eternal verities:
but so long as total charges appear reasonable, imperfect calculations and
minor inequalities do not raise a particularly important issue.23 The reason-
ableness of Western Electric prices, however, is still hotly debated and will
later be discussed in another connection.
Despite the ventilation of intercorporate relationships permitted by the
Chicago Telephone case, state regulation still labors under numerous dis-
advantages. 'Most serious is the common blight of all utility regulation, the
litigious atmosphere of rate-making, with its costly paraphernalia of valuation
and cloudy rules of law. 2 9 The difficulties are accentuated in Bell cases by
25. The Company allots at least 907 of research and development (Bell Telephone
Laboratories) and 95% of General Department costs to license contract activities. The
951/c is particularly vulnerable, implying as it does that the American Company (Long
Lines aside) would scarcely exist were it not for services properly chargeable to tele-
phone rate-payers. The methods of allocation, though ccmplex, are ased on exercies of
judgment by A.T.&T. executives. See ProrOSED Rmcant 176: for the Compin 's
presentation, see Record 611, 819 etc., in Lindhelimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 22 U. S.
151 (1934).
26. See Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R. (x.s.) 113, 154 (1934). License contract
payments have also been disallowed altogether on the ground that the t.Tmpany's cost
presentations fail to sustain the burden of proof of reasonableness required by the Chicago
Telephone case. Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R. (x.s.) 61, 100 (Ore. P. S. Comm.
1934), reeJd on other grounds, Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. Wallace, 75 P. (2d) 942 (Ore.
1938). The cases on this subject since the Chicago case are collected in Prnorosm
REPORT 741.
27. In rate case presentations, the Company has apportioned departmental costs
among the -Associated Companies on a variety of bases-plant, revenues, number of
employees or stations, and assorted composite ratios thereof. Prorosm Rro: 747. Selec-
tion of such arbitrary standards is necessary because A. T. & T. accounting df.,es not reveal
the specific object of most license contract services. Indeed, much of the benefits of
centralization might be lost if a precise cataloguing of every General Department activity
were necessary. Compare id. at 184 with A. T. &T. CO'MME.T No. 21. The basis for
license contract payments-percentage of gross revenue-may also le criticized as hearing
no relation to services rendered. See City of Memphis v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
6 P.U.R. (-x.s.) 464, 476 (Tenn. 1934).
28. Service at cost is the goal of § 13 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 [49 STAT. 825, 15 U. S. C. § 79(m) (Supp. 1938)], which strictly regulates the
service contracts, once much-abused, of the electric utilities. See Ransmeier, Regulalion
of Ser-ice Clzarges in Holding Cominany Systeyns (1938) 14 J. Lmxn & P. U. Eco . 32;
Comment (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 957.
29. Telephone cases are used as horrible examples by commentators on the rate-
making process. For the tortuous history of the New York and Chicago cases, see
Brandeis, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 29S U. S. 38.
88 (1936); FRANxFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND rTs Govanamxr (1930) 95. Telephone
rate cases in Michigan and Ohio, recently settled, had dragged on for 17 and 14 years,
respectively. Hearings before House Appropriations Subcommillee on Indetpndeni Ofices
Appropriation Bill, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1494.
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the superior resources of the Company.30 Not only can it command more
experienced and able advocates than can the public's representatives, but on
such issues as Western Electric prices, recurring in almost every case, it has
perfected a mobile battery of experts and evidence which can be brought to
bear on whatever forces each isolated Commission can muster.3 1 It is true
that the Chicago Telephone case gave the Commissions a tactical advantage
by putting the burden of proof on the Company, but that dubious procedural
formula is easily overbalanced by the absence of any direct authority over
intercompany affairs. As a result, the Commissions can only refuse to coun-
tenance for rate-making purposes completed transactions over whose initiation
they have no control.
3 2
Federal telephone regulation began in 1910 when Congress in effect occupied
the interstate field by declaring interstate telephone companies common car-
riers and giving the Interstate Commerce Commission broad jurisdiction over
them. But no special appropriations were ever made for this added function.
The only important achievements of I. C. C. regulation were the establish-
ment of uniform systems of accounts (1913) and depreciation charges (1926
and 1931). 33 The Federal Communications Act of 1934 transferred juris-
diction to the new Communications Commission, which was given power to
disapprove and declare rates, to pass on consolidations and require connec-
tions, to prescribe accounting forms and depreciation charges; in short, to
carry on conventional regulatory activities.3 4 The draftsmen of the Act took
30. See, for an example, Baldridge, Effect upon State Powers of Expanded Federal
Control in the Public Utility Field (1936) 1 Mo. L. REV. 245.
31. Thus, the same justification of license contract fees (supra, p. 1019), and the
same comparison of Western's profits and prices with those of other manufacturers (infra,
p. 1028), have apparently been presented in every important rate case since the Chicago
Telephone case, usually by the same A. T. & T. officials.
32. The Chicago Telephone case further complicated the task of telephone rate-
making by insisting on a stricter separation of inter- and intrastate business than had
theretofore prevailed. The constitutional basis for the requirement was unimpeachable:
the state commissions could have no jurisdiction over a business properly regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. And from a somewhat narrow strategic point of
view, the ruling was helpful to the state commissions, because previous divisions had
tended to ascribe too much of the property to the intrastate business and the intrastate
rate base. Since the unduly narrowed interstate business was subject only to nomnal
Federal regulation, this had been decidedly to the Company's interest. But the separation
studies made with some excess of zeal under the mandate of the Chicago Telephone case
were exceedingly expensive and laborious; and the emergence of active interstate regu-
lation since 1934 has removed any incentive to minimize the proportion of the property
under Federal jurisdiction, since to do so would only result in a diminution of permissible
earnings. Certain problems remain, however; notably, a disagreement whether any part
of the local exchange property, through which interstate messages reach the subscriber.
should be allotted to interstate use. See PROPOSED REPORT 752; Wheat, Regulation of
Interstate Telephone Rates (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 846, 866.
33. PRoPosED REPORT ix., n. 4.
34. 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151 (1934).
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great pains, however, to leave state jurisdiction unimpaired: and to insure
that in possible areas of conflict, such as uniform accounting and interstate
separation, the views of the state authorities would be heard.P3
Minor investigations directed by the Act 7 were absorbed in 1935 in a
full-dress telephone investigation ordered by joint resolutiontg and carried
on for three years 39 at a cost to the government of $1,500,000.40 Its stated
purpose was to compile comprehensive information in aid of regulation, and
to bring to light any derelictions lurking in the American Company's struc-
ture, rates, monopolistic control, accounting, and methods of competition."x
The result was an extensive and sometimes minute overhauling of every phase
6f the Company's activities having any possible bearing on regulation. In
40,000 pages of exhibits and 8,000 pages of testimony, the investigation
35. §§2(b)(1), 213(h), 221(a), and especially 221(b), denying Federal jurisdiction
over exchange service, even though a portion of it constitutes interstate commerce.
36. §§220(i), 221(a) and (c).
37. §§215, 220(j).
38. Public Res. No. 8, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 STAT. 43, approved March 15, 1935.
39. Public hearings were concluded June 30, 1937. The PeorosED Rro.nr appeared
April, 1938.
40. PRoPOsED REPORr ix. A.T. & T. estimates that the investigation cost it "some-
what over $3,000,000." Communication to YALE LAw Jotm.NL, Jan. 11, 1939. For the
background and personnel of the investigation, which at its peak had a staff of 302,
see Welch, WIhat will Come of the F. C. C.'s Telephone Investigation? (1938) 22 P. U.
FORT. 494; Hearings before House Appropriations Subcommitee on Independent Offices
Appropriation Bill, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1487.
41. The Commission allotted $150,000 of the appropriation to a Rates and Research
Department to prosecute continuing studies on telephone rate problems. The interrelations
of rates for different services over varying distances form a structure of which the ra-
tionale and the intricacies have never been adequately explored. The F.C.C., besides
attempting to work out a basic analysis, claims credit for long-distance rate reductions
aggregating some $24,000,000 annually. PROPOSED Rolnr xii. The Company denies that
the Commission even participated in any but a $12,000,000 reduction of January, 1937.
A. T. & T. BRIEF 8. It is clear, however, that the pace of toll reductions accelerated after
the investigation began. Aside from the unanswerable question of wto is to receive
"credit" for the reductions, the successful creation of a pernanuent rate researd bureau
might well be the most valuable contribution of tie investigation. In the regulation of
interstate rates, where the Commission has jurisdiction, changes agreed upon by informal
negotiation are certainly more desirable than formal proceedings shadowed by the threat
of protracted litigation. 'Moreover, comprehensive research by the Federal Commission
can furnish an example for state boards having or contemplating similar bureaus, and
valuable data for all. The F.C.C.'s Rates and Research Dept., however, expired for lad
of funds (Hearings before House Appropriations Subeommittee on Independent Offices
Appropriation Bill, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1416); its revival is contemplated in
Senator Wheeler's proposed F.C.C. Reorganization bill; see (1939) 23 P. U. Foar.
286. See generally PRorosm REPORT 755, and Vhieat, Regulation of Interstate Telephone
Rates (1938) 51 -.'av. L. REv. 846 (by the investigation's rate counsel).
42. Half the exhibits consisted of reports by the investigating staff. Five-eighths of
the testimony was by A. T. & T. officials. A. T. & T. has complained bitterly that the
investigation was unfair, not only in spirit but because it was not permitted to offer
rebuttal testimony or to cross-examine. A. T. &T. BRIEF 1-7. Since the inquiry was
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delved into the sixty-three year history of the American Company and its
predecessors, projecting criticisms and analyses of present policies against
a wealth of material for the historian of giant corporate enterprise. The work
has been summed up in the Proposed Report submitted to the Commission
for adoption. Weaving significant historical threads into the pattern of cur-
rent telephone problems, it is a severe criticism of the Bell System and,
implicitly, of regulatory techniques heretofore employed. Although the anat-
omy of the industry has been laid bare with a scalping-knife rather than a
scalpel-an unfortunate animus seems unwilling to concede that the Company's
rise has ever been motivated by impulses other than greed and thirst for
power 43-the Report makes a case for closer regulation, and presents im-
portant recommendations, some calling for further legislation, others for
action within the Commission's present jurisdiction.
According to the Report,44 the Commission already has the means at hand
to solve depreciation problems which have embroiled innumerable telephone
cases. The conflict is double-edged :45 first, what annual charges can reason-
ably be included in operating expenses; second, what disposition, in rate-base
calculation, should be made of depreciation reserves invested in the business?
When the rate-payers will absorb the added expense, as is the case with a
strong utility like the Telephone Company, the tendency is to exaggerate
the rate of depreciation and make excessive annual charges, because the
resulting excess reserve, reinvested in the plant, is in effect a reservoir of
concealed and perhaps unwarranted profits. For many years depreciation
accruals have absorbed 22%7 of Bell operating expenses. 40 To test the validity
of this figure requires an engineers' battle over the predicted retirement rates
of thousands of equipment classes and individual units. In so technologically
complex an industry, the engineering and accounting are unavoidably intricate;
a legislative one and looking to no administrative order, it seems clear that the Company
had no legal right to rebut or cross-examine. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Produts Co. v.
United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933). Chairman McNinch of the F.C.C. has stated that
"one or maybe a few" Commissioners "thought it would have been better" to give
A.T.&T. such privileges. But Commissioner Walker, defending the fairness of tile
investigation, has estimated that it would have taken five years if the Company's requests
had been granted. Hearings before House Appropriations Subcommitlee on Independent
Offices Appropriation Bill, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1492-5, 1500.
43. This predisposition is reflected in a tendency to force facts into a mold of
deliberate policy, usually anti-social or selfish, whether or not they will reasonably bear
such interpretation, and in a coloring of what purports to be an objective narrative by
invidious descriptive emphasis.
44. C. 11.
45. Though complex, it must be summarily outlined. For general discussions of
depreciation problems, substantially supporting the views expressed herein, see PUtIC
SERVICE COaIEM. OF WIscoNsIN, DEPRECIATION (1933) ; BAUER AND GOLD, PU3LIC UTILITY
VALUATION (1934) c. 9; NATIONAL Ass'N Op RAILROAD AND UTILITIES ComIlssIoNuRus,
PROCEEDINGS, 1938 (1939) 438.
46. PROPOSED REPORT 403.
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on the'other hand, the Company's vast experience with almost every type of
equipment should facilitate the actuarial computations on which service-life
estimates may depend. A fair result is more than a matter of good accounting.
Increased operating expenses and an inflated rate base are the result of giving
the Company a free hand in computing depreciation schedules.
This incentive to heap up reserves would probably not exist if the courts
had not misunderstood the application to rate-making of straight-line depre-
ciation, the method employed by the Bell System. Roughly, straight-line
depreciation recovers the entire cost of a piece of equipment, less net salvage,
in a series of equal payments spread over its predicted service-life. Since the
reserve accumulated pending retirements is invested in the telephone plant,
it seems elementary that, until the old property is entirely written off, the
rates should not have to include any profit on the new property represented
by the depreciation reserve. If a profit is allowed, the Company recovers
more than the equipment cost, and the ratepayer is fleeced. When the I. C. C.
promulgated its uniform depreciation charges in 1926, the order pointed to
the "inseparable connection between the straight-line method and the principle
that accrued depreciation represented by the depreciation reserve must be
deducted in ascertaining rate-base value." It declared that "if any other
principle should hereafter be adopted by the courts, a reconsideration of the
entire question of depreciation accounting would at once become necessary." 4 7
It would seem that the courts have adopted another principle--that actual
or existing depreciation must be deducted from the rate-base A5 This is a
fair-sounding standard; but if there have been over-accruals the reserve may
exceed the "actual" depreciation, and simple deduction of the reserve without
attempting to see whether it coincided with the "actual" depreciation 40 has
been condemned by the Court as "rough and ready," O though, as has been
pointed out, it would seem that in 'no event would a smaller deduction be
warranted. The A. T. & T., moreover, has with great profit confounded con-
fusion by identifying "actual" with "observed" depreciation.5' This means,
47. Depreciation Charges of Telephone Companies, 118 LC.C. 295, 356 (1926).
48. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403 (1924) ; McCardle
v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926). It may be argued that these decisiuns
do not forbid deductions of the full reserve. See Depreciation Clarges of Telephone
Companies, 177 I.CC. 351, 405 (1931) ; Wheat, op. cit. stpra note 32 at 84, n.39. But
lower courts are at best confused, and tend to accept the Company's contentions in
telephone cases; see cases cited infra, note 54. The healthy realism of Lindheimer v.
Illinois Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934), in which the Court held thMt excessive annual
accruals invalidated a claim of confiscation, has been insufficiently followed.
49. Except under hypothetical conditions, it probably never would. Straight-line
depreciation accruals are made in regular instalments; "actual" depredation, on the
questionable assumption that its progress can be accurately detected at all. perforce
proceeds irregularly, at least so far as inadequacy and obsolescence are involved.
50. IVest v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 679 (1935).
51. An interpretation which can all too easily be drawn from the Pacific and .lMc-
Cardle cases, supra note 48.
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baldly, that while inadequacy and obsolescence-invisible agents of decay-
are essential factors in fixing depreciation charges, only visible physical depre-
ciation is counted in judging rate-base deductions. The quantitative result
is that in rate cases the company's experts only once, so far as is known, have
admitted more than 10% overall depreciation.5 2 Yet the systemwide reserve,
at the end of 1936, stood at nearly 30% of the total depreciable plant.m
Accordingly, in any rate case in which the Company's contentions are ac-
cepted-they have had a more mesmeric effect on courts than on Commis-
sions 54 -the rate base is improperly inflated by two-thirds of the depreciation
reserve. The resulting distortion of the rate base is such that Company fair
value figures may "prove" that a growing, prosperous plant has operated
consistently under grossly confiscatory rates.5
The Proposed Report takes the firm and, it is submitted, impregnable
position that in telephone cases "not less than the full depreciation reserve
52. In the Louisiana rate case, exceptionally, the Company experts admitted 11.7%
depreciation. See La. P. S. Comm. v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 8 P.U.R. (,.s,)
1, 9 (1935). More representative figures are: Chicago, 9% and 8% [Lindheiner v. Ill.
Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151, 159 (1934)1 ; Oklahoma City, 6.7C/o [Re Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 16 P.U.R. (N.s.) 1, 4 (1936)]; Wisconsin, 10% [Re Wisconsin Tel. Co., 13
P.U.R. (N.s.) 224, 298 (1934)].
53. PROPOSED REPORT 409; at the end of 1938 the system-wide reserve was $1,253,-
100,000, 27.9% of total telephone plant and equipment. A.T. & T. ANN VAL RtronT voRL
1938 (1939) 2.
54. In the following Bell rate cases of the last decade the entire reserve was deducted:
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. West, 7 F. Supp. 214 (D. Md. 1934), disapproved,
295 U. S. 662, 679 (1935); Re Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., P.U.R. 1933 A, 20 (Mium.
R. R. Comm. 1932) semble, rcv'd, P.U.R. 1933A, 38 (D. Minn. 1932) ; Re Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel., 7 P.U.R. (x.s.) 21 (N. C. 1934) ; Re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 9 P.X.R.
(N.s.) 113 (Okla. 1935), aff'd, 71 P. (2d) 747 (1937), app. dismissed 303 U. S. 201
'(1938); N. Y. Tel. Co. v. Prendergast, 36 F. (2d) 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1929). Another
group rejected the concept of observed depreciation, but held that, even though excessive
accruals had produced an overlarge reserve, only existing depreciation could be deducted:
Re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 4 P.U.R. (x.s.) 346 (D. C. 1934) semble; Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. v. Georgia P. S. Comm., 2 P.U.R. (-,.s.) 234 (D. Ga. 1933); Re
Wisconsin Tel., 13 P.U.R. (N.s.) 224 (1936), rcVd, Circuit Ct., Dane County (1938) ;
Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R. (N.s.) 113 (1934) semble, rev'd on other grolinds, 301
U. S. 292 (1937); La. P. S. Comm. v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 8 P.UR. (N.s.) 1 (1934),
aff'd, 187 La. 137, 174 So. 180 (1937) (same rationale, but existing depreciation found
practically equal to reserve) ; cf. Re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., P.U.R, 1933 B,
181 (S. C. 1933) (deduction equals fair annual charge times average life of property).
The Company's theories were apparently accepted in "vVestern Buse Tel. Co. v. North-
western Bell Tel. Co., 188 Minn. 524, 248 N. W. 220 (1933) ; Memphis v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel., 6 P.U.R. (-x.s.) 464 (Tenn. 1934). Application of the sinking-fund method
obviates any deduction from the rate-base, but requires a complete new set of accrued
calculations; it was used effectively in Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co,, 14 P.U.R,
(N.s.) 252 (1936).
55. This was the case in Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 IT. S. 151 (1934),
where the court recognized that "elaborate calculations which are at war with realities
are of no avail." Id. at 164.
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should be deducted from cost in determining the rate base."1 1 It finds in
the Commission's statutory mandate to fix depreciation charges sufficient
authority to effectuate this policy. How manipulation of annual charges can
end the absurd antinomy between the Company's position on rate-base deduc-
tions and its claims for operating expenses is not clear. An effective but rather
cunning course might be to threaten to take the Company's "actual depre-
ciation" figures at face value when fixing future charges.5 -7 In any event,
a forthright stand by the Commission will be one step toward clarification oi
an unnecessarily confused phase of regulation.53
The Report's major recommendations for further legislation lead into fields
less well mapped than the bloody ground of depreciation. Most far-reaching
is a blunt proposal that the Federal Commission be given power "to review,
56. PRoPosED REPORT 693. The foregoing discussion has emphasized the necessity of
deducting the full reserve in rate-base calculations, even though (1) rate case valuations
are happily fairly infrequent, (2) the final fair-value figure, usually a compromise, may
or may not accurately reflect the deduction. In view of these facts, it may be argu
that it is far more important to prevent excessive accruals in the first place. If, however,
the full reserve will invariably be deducted, there will be less incentive to over-accrual,
and it is believed that the present fogs that enshroud valuation may before long b2
dispelled. For a gleam of light, see Black, J., dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water
Co., 302 U. S. 419, 423 (1938). But the importance of keeping annual accruals within
bounds is not to be minimized. Excesses not only swell the rate-base but inflate oper-
ating expenses. In Bell Telephone cases, a reduction of 1% in operating expenses will
have the same effect on total revenue requirements as a 4% decrease in the rate base.
The depreciation charges disallowed in the Louisiana case amounted to more than 7%
of operating expenses. La. P. S. Comm. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 8 P.U.R. (:;.s.)
1, 24 (1934), aff'd, 187 La. 137, 174 So. 180 (1937). Reductions in depredation rates
have been made or recommended in a number of recent cases. E.g., Re Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 11 P.U.R. (x..s.) 337 (1935) (5.12% to 3.82%7c); s. c., 17 P.U.R. (n.s.)
458 (Neb., 1937) (further reduction to 3.33%).
57. If, as the Company contends, actual depreciation is never more than 101, and
since, in recent cases, the average age of the property is 5-10 years, an annual allowance
of 1-2% would be sufficient, in contrast to the circa 5% which the Company usually
claims as a fair element of operating expense. Of course, the Company would be the
first to disavow its observed depreciation figures as a basis for annual charges.
58. Another recommendation of the REPORT concerning depreciation wears a some-
what novel aspect. Briefly, it apparently proposes periodically to re-examine equipment
groups and to revise life-predictions and accordingly accruals if changing conditions
seem to warrant. The Company attacks this as an heretical deviation from straight-line
theology. Certainly, constant tinkering with the rates would be inadvisable and expensive.
Though the Company itself frequently changes clearly erroneous predictions, it con-
tends that over- and under-accruals generally tend to cancel. The chief occasion for a
general revision would be a major event like the last depression. Wear-and-tear and
inadequacy factors calculated on the expanding business of the late '20s would scarcely he
valid in view of the quantity of unused equipment that accumulated. But predictions made
in depression would be equally erroneous, and Board of Commissioners v. New Yorl:
Telephone Co., 271 U. S. 23 (1926), stands in the way of retrospective adjustments.
Compare PROPOSED REPoRT 392 with A. T. & T. Co:,r3.mtr No. 13.
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approN;e, or disapprove all Bell System policies and practices promulgated by
the..central management group of the American Company." '
Evaluation of this proposition requires some digression into the scope of
regulation. In telephone cases, cost has been the chief concern of the Com-
missions; but only some elements of it are regulated at all closely. Thus
earnings, absorbing some 19% 60 of the System's receipts, are at the heart
of every rate-case. But the somewhat unsatisfactory state of the law in that
field, as will later be shown, results in rather haphazard control. Depreciation
takes 15%o; its disposition has already been outlined.01 Putting aside taxes,
an uncontrollable 147%,32 there still remains a little more than half of the
System's, income, which goes for operating expenses (in a narrow sense), 03
and which generally is not at all carefully policed. In this domain, manage-
ment reigns--practically supreme.
64
I The investigators argue that since policies dictated by the central manage-
ment govern operations throughout the system, any unwisdom in high places
is ulagnified a thousand-fold, and hence some check should be placed on the
untranmelled power of the management." Undoubtedly it is desirable,
wherever practical, for regulatory judgment to prevent the inception of an
extravagant project rather than to condemn it retrospectively. On this general
ground, approval by the Commission of central management policies might
be a useful requirement, since the quality and half the cost of telephone
service are involved. On the other hand, there is no assurance or even like-
lihood that the reviewing authority would be more accurate than Bell engineers
in prejudging a program's effectiveness. And while the power might be
exercised cooperatively, it might interpose a hidebound veto and paralyse a
generally able management. With theoretical advantages and disadvantages
about balanced, such an extension of regulation as the proposal contemplates
would hardly be justified unless a definite need for it were shown in the
Company's history or policies.
The Report professes to have found this justification chiefly in past failures
of A. T. & T. either to adopt improved equipment or to choose the type best
59. PRoPosE REPORT 698.
60. These percentages are necessarily approximate and for items like profits will
fluctuate from year to year. Intended only to indicate relative distribution of income,
they are based on the consolidated income statements in A. T.&T. ANNUAL R;ro0RT
FOR 1937 (1938) 18; id. FOR 1938 (1939) 22.
61. Supra, p. 1022.
62. And rising steadily. A. T. & T. ANNuAL REPORT FOR 1938 (1939) 2.
63. Approximately 15% for traffic, 8% for commercial, 10% for general and iniscel-
laneous expenses, and 20% for maintenance. Supra note 60. The high degree of main-
tenance is extremely relevant in considering the rate of depreciation.
64. See Wheat, op. cit. supra note 32, at 857; Cf. HER NG AND GRoss, TELtco0 tI'N-
cATioNs (1936) 347.
65. PROPOSED REPORT 315, 687.
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fitted to the service.66 Stoutly the Company defends its policies,", leaving the
whole .controversy so involved a welter of engineering and accounting that it
would be futile to attempt to review it in a legal publication. It may be said,
however, that to a non-expert reader the Report convincingly establishes only
one major engineering blunder.68 When the Company embarked in 1919 on
large-scale installation of dial central-office equipment, costs were seriously
underestimated. Even though the equipment was sold to the Associated
Companies at a higher price than it had first been offered, Western sustained
heavy losses which, the Report asserts, it recouped in other lines. The unduly
high cost would have been defensible had corresponding economies in oper-
ating expenses been effected; but the Report shows that estimated savings
on operators' wages were almost equally erroneous, and concludes that most
dial installation unwisely swelled the rate-base while decreasing employ-
ment.69 But since costs of dial switchboards were at unduly high levels tor
only about a third of the installation, 0 it is doubtful that such a sweeping
verdict can command assent. The other examples which the investigators
present to show the need of a policy veto are either slight or disputable.-'
Consequently, the case does not seem to be proved. Of course, it would be
highly advantageous for the Federal Commission to use its superior investi-
gatory facilities to disclose management blunders which it and the state
commissions could consider in rate-base and expense allowances; but the
evidence in the Report hardly warrants the novel and possibly unhappy
experiment in regulation it proposes.
A second and less drastic request is for authority "to regulate the costs
and prices of telephone equipment. ' "2 Direct control of W'estern Electric
prices: ffects such important elements of telephone rates as maintenance_
depreciation, and earnings.7 3 If each operating company manufactured its
66. Ibid.
67. See A. T.& T. BRIEF c. 6; Comumrr No. 37.
68. The Company's attempts at long-range economic forecasting, besides forming
an entertaining comedy of errors, resulted in serious overbuilding for the depression.
See PROPOSED R'PORT 287. But over-optimism in 1928 and 1929 was a common weak-
ness. See AXGLY, OH YEAr? (1931).
69. It is also charged that an inferior type of switchboard was used. Pnalosm
REPORT 300-15.
70. A. T. & T. Co.. ra No. 37, p. 34.
71. The economics of the handset telephone are of some interest, since many customers
chafed under the additional charge made for it. The investigators contend that the
Company unduly delayed its introduction and made inordinate profits out of it, but that
their disclosures ended the practice. PRoPosED REPoRT -dii, 665. The Company enters
a strong general denial. A. T.&T. BRIEF 11; COMIENT No. 38. A supposedly inde-
pendent survey confirms the investigation. Simpson, The Handset Teloplizoe; 1 Proa'er
in Public Utility Regulation (1937) 13 J. L.ANDo & P. U. Ecox. 330.
72. PRoPosED REPORT 698.
73. Earnings are affected because of the estimated 60% of Western equipment in
the rate-base. Id. at 661.
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own equipment, there would be little doubt that the expenses incurred would
be subject to state regulatory scrutiny.7 4 Since Western is the manu-
facturing department for the whole system, it should be equally open to
investigation. Under the Chicago Telephone case, state commissions can re-
quire proof of the reasonableness of its prices and profits ;7r but the sort of
evidence that has been presented before state commissions in Western's
behalf is necessarily superficial.
Elaborate tabulations in the Proposed Report indicate that Western's
profits in its early unregulated years were rather inordinate.70 For present
purposes, however, only the last two decades would seem particularly relevant,
since the equipment composing the present telephone plant was largely built
within that period.77 On average investment less depreciation reserve, earn-
ings for 1916-36 were 67; on common stock equity (paid-in capital, surplus,
reserves), 7.7o.78 In rate cases since the Chicago Telephone decision, the
Company has justified these earnings by showing that they averaged roughly
a third less than those of a supposedly comparable list of 88 non-utility man-
ufacturing corporations.79 The conclusiveness of the comparison may be
doubted; though Western may legalistically still be a manufacturing corpora-
tion, it is functionally an integral part of a great utility. Yet judged even by
utility standards its earnings have still been only slightly, if at all, excessive.
This question, moreover, is probably best considered in connection with the
total income requirements of the system.80
For many years, the Company has supported the reasonableness of Western
prices by comparing them with those of the insignificant independent tele-
phone manufacturers. The results, of course, have been decidedly favorable
to Western,81 for unlike the others it has an assured and ordered market,
74. As an element of operating expenses.
75. Semble. The language is vague; see 282 U. S. at 153. But even the Company
has assumed that it is now required to justify Western profits. PROPOSED REroRT 327.
76. Id. at 634.
77. A. T. & T. BRIEF 249.
78. A. T. & T. COMMENT No. 30, pp. 10, 14.
79. If the comparison is limited to 1925-34, as the Company would have it, Western's
earnings drop to about half those of the selected companies, which is not surprising in
view of its depression losses. The investigators' chief objection to the 88-company list
is that it includes only profitable companies. A.T. & T. attempts to defend this hand-
picking by asserting that only profitable corporations are comparable to Western[ See
A. T. & T. COMMENT No. 26, replying to Exhibit No. 2107, a staff report on Western
Electric Co., Reasonableness of Stated Profits.
80. See infra, p. 1032.
81. Company figures show that average prices of independents run from 21% to 36%
higher than Western's. PROPOSED REPORT 328. The REPORT attacks these figures, and
on the basis of a rather unrepresentative selection of items attempts to show that the
independent prices are actually lower than Western's, an untenable position. Compare
id. at 327-35 with A. T. & T. CO.MMxLNT No. 27 and BRIEF 97-129.
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large volume, no credit risk, and no sales expense. s2 In view of the utter
disparity in conditions of production, the figures are not very instructive.
Western is sui generis, and the reasonableness of its prices can be judged
only by establishing reasonable costs for its thousands of products and by
limiting it to reasonable profits. Since the task of establishing a complete
set of costs would be herculean, the investigators had to be content with
samples garnered on the accounting level; yardstick operations were scarcely
feasible.
At the outset it appears that WVestern's composite price level moves in a
somewhat queer fashion when compared to indices of general manufactured
goods.83 Notably, when other products declined sharply in the early '30s,
Western prices were increased in an attempt to cover as far as possible the
overhead resulting from tremendous plant expansion on the eve of the depres-
sion.St It is also charged, though the proof is not conclusive, that prices are
manipulated to earn large profits on such non-competitive items as heavy
switchboards, while on products which Western sells to the general trade in
active competition, such as lead-covered cable, costs are barely recovered, thus
assuring Western a share of the general business and forestalling invidious
price comparisons.85 These phenomena of monopolistic pricing lend added
zest to the hunt for valid costs.
The quest, the investigators next allege, was sadly hampered by the sup-
posed inadequacies of Western's accounting. Besides being cumbersome and
expensive, it is said to be utterly unreliable for determining "actual" costs.80
Western currently manufactures approximately 23,000 designs of apparatus
and equipment. To keep precise and up-to-the-minute cost records for all
these lines, only a part of which are on a mass-production basis,8 7 would be,
if not prohibitive, at least far more costly than the present system which is
82. A. T. & T. COMMENT- No. 27, p. 13, half-heartedly denies these advantages, while
Saddling Western with the "unique disadvantage" of having to hold itself ready to serve
the Associated Companies at any time under the Standard Supply Contract, which (se
PaoPosED REorr 730) is the Same kind of contract as the License Contract.
83. Id. at 318-26; but cf. A. T. & T. BRIEF 85-96.
84. There were a general 10% increase in 1930, an increase of 20-3Wc in central-
office equipment in 1933, and two smaller rises, all during a period when wages and ma-
terials were falling. Many courts, and commissions have refused to consider the price
increases in rate-base and expense calculations. See, e.g.. Re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
9 P.U.R. (x.s.) 113, 121 (1935), aff'd. 71 P. (2d) 747 (1937), app. dismissed, 303 U. S.
206 (1938). The company contends that 1929 prices were abnormally low, and that the
increases were a return to normal. One court has accepted this explanation. Wisconsin
Tel. Co. v. P. S. Comm. of Wis., Circuit Ct., Dane County (1938); cf. Re Customers
of New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 5 P.T.R. (-,.s.) 333 (Mass. 1934).
85., PROPOSED REPORT 324. 385: contrast A. T. & T. CoUM.Nr No. 27, p. 69.
86. PROPOSED REPORT 338, 346.
87. Of 64% of the units, less than 100 a year are produced. Production e.Nceeds
100,000 for less than 1% (survey made in 1931). A. T. & T. BMEF 93; ProrosFu RE-
PORT 360.
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attacked for its expense.8 8 Western develops what it considers reasonably
accurate cost estimates by computing relatively direct costs for a product
and adding an overhead loading, both under hypothetical normal conditions.
Variations from the assumed standard for any element of cost at any given
time are adjusted to produce "current complete costs.' '8 If properly admin-
istered, as the Company contends it is, such a system should be adequate
for most purposesP° The investigators, while disputing its sufficiency as a
guide to "actual" costs, nevertheless compare Western current costs with
what they call "actual" costs of the independents, and find Western's 20%o
higher.92 The accuracy of these comparisons is seriously questioned by the
Company, which contends that the independents' so-called "actual" cost figures
were carelessly constructed by the investigators from inconclusive data.
2
The will o' the wisp of "actual" costs is seen at its most elusive in the
attempts of the Proposed Report to show by unreal accounting manipulations
what Western's costs should be. An array of "maximum permissible costs"
was constructed from Western's material and labor figures for 1933-35, with
an overhead loading designed to reflect what were considered normal con-
ditions by averaging expenses for the period 1927-35. They were compared
with Western's current complete costs, apparently for 1936, and again the
latter were found too high by 20%.'3 The Company refuses any significance
whatever to this tabulation, citing numerous factual errors.04 All it would
seem to prove is that overhead, constituting 62o of Western complete costs,,'
and hence their crucial and at the same time their most slippery element, was
higher in 1936 than for the period 1927-35Y
A second set of "justifiable costs" reduces Western's overhead until its
ratio to labor costs is the same as that of the independents. 7 The result is
21.3% less than current complete costs,98 proving only the theorem that if
88. A. T. & T. BRIEF 135, 140; PROPOSED REPORT 357.
89. Id. at 338. Standard (hypothetical normal) costs were not adjusted from 1930
to 1936 because it was felt that depression-based estimates would be of no Ion),, tility;
consequently the current variation percentages often run more than 100%. Id. at 341,
348;.A. T. & T. BRIEF 136. This would not seem to affect their validity.
90. See Bickley, That Two-Year Phone Probe (1938) 21 P. 'L. FonT. 771, 784,
This article, a general critique of the PROPOSED REPORT, is especially complete on the
subject of Western Electric prices, and is in considerable agreement with the views e*-
pressed herein. The author was Chief Accountant during most of the investigation.
91. PROPOSED REPORT 361.
92. A. T. & T. COIMENT No. 28, p. 23; BRIEF 142.
93. PROPOSED REPORT 362-72.
94. A. T. & T. BRIEF 153-67.
95. PROPOSED REPORT 381.
96. The Company would presumably agree with this conclusion. since it (toes not
consider conditions in 1936 comparable to those for 1927-35. See A. T. & T. CoNIMNwr
No. 29, p. 8.
97. The costs are strangely calculated. Id. at 46.
98. PROPOSED REPORT 380.
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Western had lower overhead it would have lower costs; for it can scarcely
be argued that Western, producing a complete line of telephone products in
highly mechanized plants, should have as low an overhead as the independents.
The Report also contends, however, that Western does not -ave appreciably
on materials, and shows that it pays 14% better wages than the independents,
a factor which would weigh heavily in overhead as well.02
If Western's overhead and consequently its total costs are deemed excessive,
three inferences could be drawn: It is clear that the tremendous expansion
of the system during the '20sl'° left Western with much idle plant to devour
maintenance and increase overhead costs. During the 1933-35 period, which
the cost calculations covered, sales were less than a fourth of the 1929 peak-;
by 1937 they had risen only to a half.10 1 The Report should have fully con-
sidered this factor. It may be that part of Western's investment should not
be considered in judging the reasonableness of its profits and costs, on the
analogy of eliminating from utility rate-bases property not used or useful ;102
but the point seems not to be directly made or supported in the Report.
Second, Western perhaps may be too large'for economical operation. Some
passages in the Report suggest this contention;203 but no adequate evidence
is given, and no concrete proposals for decentralization are advanced. Third,
it may be that Western's organization and operation are inefficient. On the
basis of the calculations previously outlined, the Report makes the remarkable
suggestion that Western prices could be reduced 30% and still leave a 6%
return on net investment.104 One would suppose that such a sharp cut would
require drastic operating economies and plant reorganization; but except for
tentative discussions of shop organization and of the advantages of multi-
shift operation, 0 5 no constructive proposals are put forward. Accounting
legerdemain will not produce real savings; more engineering criticism would
seem to be in order before inefficiency is proved.
The device proposed to reduce Western prices is regulation by the Federal
Commission as a public utility.'00 But until a concrete and practical program
for engineering and technical reform is advanced, the only effective use of
such power would be to iron out supposed irregularities in the price structure
and to reduce profits. And it should be remembered that limitation of Western
99. Ibid. Compare Bickley, supra note 90, at 785. The REPonr does not, and prob-
ably could not with discretion, condemn Western's higher labor costs, occasioned partly
by higher hourly rates, partly by additional benefits such as vacations, pensions, etc.
PROPOSED REPORT 378.
100. Id. at 41.
101. And in 1938 they fell off 14% to $175,163,000, as compared to $411,000,000 in
1929. See A. T. & T. ANxxUAL REPORTs.
102. See BAUER AND GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALTTATION (1934) 173.
103. E.g., 380, 384.
104. PROPOSED REPORT 659-61.
105. Id. at 342, 372, 384.
106. Id. at 701. Creation of a state of enforced competition is rejected as impracti-
cable.
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to a "fair return" by utility standards might give it a corresponding right
to such a return. 0 7 If Western's profits disappeared in the next depression
as they did in the last, a doctrine restrictive in its origin might sanctify price
increases of dubious economic validity. On the whole, it may be said that
while close Federal supervision of Western would in theory be preferable
to necessarily superficial state examinations, the data in the Proposed Report
would not lead one to expect a very happy exercise of the authority. A
well-staffed bureau with full investigatory powers, however, might, through
continuing scrutiny, pay its way by exposing wasteful or extravagant con-
ditions which both State and Federal Commissions could consider in rate-
making. For the disappointing result of the current investigation should
not blind observers to Western's place as a vital element in telephone regu-
lation.
Though the foregoing survey of Western regulatory problems perhaps
bulks disproportionately large in this Comment, the complexities and uncer-
tainties it reveals are indicative of similar difficulties in other phases of
A. T. & T. activity. These can b'e dealt with here only summarily. The place
of research, patents, and non-communications developments in the system,
for example, is a subject of heated controversy between investigators and
Company. The Report contends that of the annual $16,000,000 spent by
A. T. & T. and Western on engineering and research, too large a share goes
to fence out independent enterprise with a Chinese Wall of patents--there
are 9,000 in force-or to projects having no connection with telephone com-
munication.'0 8 The Company believes it has a duty to protect its service
and its investors by keeping always in the van of technical progress. It
deprecates the non-communications activities as employing at most 1% of
the system's assets. 0 9 Though they are a varied assortment, only one, talking-
picture equipment, is of great importance. Western pioneered in this field
and through patent control still pursues a dominant but litigious career;110
yet turbulent and significant as that story is, the total receipts, some $5,000,-
000,"'1 are only a drop in the A. T. & T. bucket.
Of greater importance to telephone users generally is the remaining major
element of cost still to be examined-the cost of capital, one-fifth of the total
107. Cf. Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R. (N.s.) 113, 124 (1934).
108. PRoposED REPoRT, cc. 7, 8, 14.
109. Their exploitation centers in a Western subsidiary, Electrical Research Products,
Inc. See A. T. & T. BRIEF 23, 40, 204. The controversy is also put in terms of whether
too much research and development expenditure goes for communications services Other
than wire telephones, e.g., transoceanic radio telephony.
110. The latest chapter is General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,
304 U. S. 175, aff'd on rehearing, 59 Sup. Ct. 116 (U. S. 1938). Compare Pnoroso
REP ORT, c. 14 with A. T. & T. BRIEF 209 and Supplement 45 for accounts of ERPI's
licensing system.
111. Public address systems, a related development, have brought in $3,426,000. A. T.
& T. BRIEF 205-6. .
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telephone bill. The return cannot under present rules be based entirely on
prudent investment less depreciation ;1 it must be based on that hodge-podge
of reproduction cost, historical cost, compromise and guesswork which is
blandly called "fair value.""' 3 Depreciation and material charges are essential
factors in value calculations and thereby affect not only operating expenses
but permissible profits; and, as has been pointed out, depredation is often
decisive of whether a rate reduction can be sustained in the courts. The
Company, classically, is entitled to a return on the fair value "reasonably
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and
. . . adequate, under economical and efficient management, to . . . enable
it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties."
1"'
The A. T. & .T. is, of course, the fountainhead of Bell System financing.
While Associated Companies issue bonds directly to the public, their short-
term funds come from the parent company, to be transmuted and absorbed
in stock issues if they are used for plant additions.11 In return, the operating
companies pay 5% interest on loans, dividends on stock, license contract fees,
and, indirectly, profits to Western Electric. Added to these are Long Lines
earnings and non-telephone revenue. The entire amnount is the source for
interest on A. T. & T.'s $430,000,000 funded debt and for dividends on its
almost 19,000,000 shares of stock.110 It would seem to be axiomatic that a
rate of return, even on the shifting sands of the present-day rate-base, should
be estimated in the light of system-wide needs and resources.1 7 The frag-
mentary character of regulation, it must be admitted, makes it difficult for
each Commission to decide what the portion of Bell assets under its juris-
diction should contribute to the support of the common capital fund. The
difficulty is no excuse for the careless assumption, to which reviewing courts
are especially addicted, that a non-confiscatory return is simply a round
number-say 6% on the rate base-which has an equitable ring to ears
112. Cf. Railroad Comm. v. Pacific Gas & Electric, 302 U. S. 3S8 (1938).
113. The confusion surrounding this concept is illustrated by the current spate of
articles on the subject. See, e.g., Nerlove, Bonbright, Smith, Valuation of Properly
(1939) 6 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 157; Cook, A Statutory Definition of Fair Valuc (1939) 7
Gao. WAsH. L. RE%-. 475; Hale, The Fair Value Merry-Go-Round, 1898-i3s (1939) 33
ILL. L REv. 517.
114. And the return should be "equal to that generally being made at the same time
and in the same general part of the country oz' investments in other business under-
takings which are attended by corresponding risks." Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co.
v. P. S. Comm. of West Virginia, 262 U. S. 679, 692 (1923). For te application of this
formula to Bell Companies, see Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133, 161 (1930):
"It is necessary to consider the actual effect of the rates imposed in the light of the
utility's situation, its requirements and opportunities . . . we are not dealing with an
ordinary public utility company . .
115. 'PROPOSED REPORT c. 15.
116. Id. at 583; A. T. & T. ANzxUTAL REPORr Fon 1938 (1939) 27.
117. Supra, note 114.
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accustomed to damage calculations in contract cases." 8 Relevant considera-
tions in a Bell Telephone case are the marketability of Bell securities at
various interest rates, the ratio of bonds to stock, the leverage of holding com-
pany common stock. The inquiry leads finally to the citadel of 640,000119
security-holders, the apparently impregnable $9 A. T. & T. dividend.120 The
Proposed Report' 2 ' marshals a mass of information which casts some doubt
on the inevitability of that classic return; it can be of great value to regu-
lators who are disposed to consider realistically their part in canalizing earn-
ings without either flooding or damming the golden stream.
If fair treatment of investors past and future is to be a key factor in
governing profit regulation, some control over new investment would seem
to be desirable.122 While the Bell System, with only 17.34% of fixed debt123
and only one important class of stock, is a model of utility financing, simplicity
in regulation would be furthered if capital additions were to be scrutinized
before they could become part of the rate-base and demand a return. A
growing number of state commissions have this power;124 since Bell financing
is essentially on a national scale, it would seem advisable to confer it on the
Communications Commission. The Bell System in the recent past has had
only modest surpluses and has expanded consistently by increasing its capital
indebtedness. 125 Consequently, authority to review financing might accom-
118. Cf. the Pennsylvania experience, where the courts early held that to avoid con-
fiscation a rate of return must be 7%l, the legal rate of interest, with the result that the
Commission automatically set returns at 7% until quite recently. See Rose, Rate of Util-
ity Return (1939) 23 P. U. FORT. 131.
119. A. T. & T. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1938 (1939) 34.
120. But cf. id. at 1; earnings in 1938 were $8.32 a share. Assuming that A. T. & T.
could get capital at a lower rate, quacre if its stockholders may not have vested rights
in an institution, i.e., the $9 dividend?
121. C. 18; but cf. A. T. & T. BRIEF C. 15.
122. See PROPOSED REPORT 704, where broad authority is requested, including power
to require competitive bidding on all security issues. Such a requirement could extend to
common stocks, ending preemptive rights which the Report criticizes as a lucrative source
of extra-dividend return in the '20s. Id. at 517. On competitive bidding generally, see
Abrams, Fallacy'of Competitivc Bidding for Public Utility Securities (1937) 19 P. U.
FORT. 414 and 476; Elgen, Value of Competitive Bidding for Utility Securities, id. at 723.
123. PROPOSED REPORT 79.
124. Compare Legis. (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 508, with Martlett and Traylor, Pub-
lic Utility Legislation in the Depressioh (1935) 11 J. LAND & P. U. EcoN. 173, 182. And
compare its extension to electric power holding-company systems in the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, § 7, 49 STAT. 815, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79g (Supp. 1938).
In sixteen states, however, commissions have no authority over security issues, and in
others only disclosure is required. NAT. Ass'N OF R. R. & UTILITIES CoM,0ISs9IONERS,
PROCEEOINGS, 1938 (1939) 397.
125. At the end of 1938 the consolidated surplus of A. T. & T. and its telephone sub-
sidiaries stood at $308,798,096 as compared with the depreciation reserve, $1,253,081,519,
A. T. & T. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1938 (1939) 21. See PROPOSED REPORT 601 for a tabula-
tion of earnings and dividends on A. T. & T. common.
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plish to a limited and probably desirable extent the control over policy changes
preiously discussed.'2 6
The criticisms and suggestions advanced in this Comment have all assumed
the continuance of the present multiple Federal-State system of telephone
regulation. It has been recognized that A. T. & T.'s nationwide domination
severely limits the effectiveness of local regulation, and the program of the
Proposed Report has been examined to see if direct Federal jurisdiction
over activities which seem to be evading regulation would strengthen the
existing system. There are, of course, other solutions. If it were felt that
profound abuses flourished for which there was no regulatory remedy, the
public interest might demand that, as in England, the telephone service b-.
nationalized. Present conditions do not seem even remotely to require such
a strong measure. Or, if state regulation is considered impotent, it may be
advisable to concentrate in the F.C.C. a measure of control roughly equivalent
to that of the I.C.C. over the railroads. But though the telephone is a national
utility, it is not a very serious national problemyiT
Furthermore, though sweeping Federal regulation could be judicially
sustained, probably not more than 15% of the business is within its present
rate-making jurisdiction,'2s and the safeguards thrown around state power
in the Communications Act12 9 suggest that Congress at least might oppose
wresting it away. Most of the suggestions made here for further Federal
action aim to supplement and strengthen state regulation.120 On a few battle-
grounds, notably depreciation, it is felt that the exercise of paramount Federal
power may at once speed a solution and relieve the state boards of a repetitious
duty. Elsewhere, as in the Western price and managerial efficiency fields, the
Federal Commission should have fact-finding powers broad enough to end
completely A. T. & T.'s inaccessibility. With fuller information acquired at
less cost, the states may be able to take up whatever regulatory slack exists.
If they are still considered ineffectual, the Federal Commission can later move
in with a background of experience such as the Proposed Report does not
invariably exhibit.
126. It is of course questionable how much expansion or change will take place in
the near future that cannot be financed internally-i.e., from depredation and pension
reserves, or surplus.
127. Even though there may be room for improvement on savings, the service, to
borrow a company clich6, is "the best in the world".
128. An estimate based on the fact that Long Lines assets amount to about 8% of
those of the whole system, while interstate business of the Associated Companies, esti-
mated from separation studies made since the Chicago Telephone case, may employ an
equal share.
129. Supra, note 35.
130. See Commissioner Walker, Co-operation between the Slate Comminssions and the
Federal Communications Commission, in NAT. Ass'x oF R. R. & UTILrrITS Co,,n.nssro.-
ans, Paocy- x'Gs, 1938 (1939) 141.
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